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ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL IREVIEW--- "MENTAL PROCESS" PRIV-
ILEGE PREVENTS DISCOVERY OF EXISTENCE OF AGENCY HEAD'S
STATUTORILY-IREQUIRED PERSONAL DEcISION-National Nutritional
Foods Association v. Food & Drug Administration, 491 F. 2d 1141
(2d Cir. 1974).
Within 13 days of being named Commissioner of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), Commissioner Schmidt issued "14 final
regulations, 13 proposed regulations and six notices stretching over
many pages of the Federal Register."' Schmidt was authorized to
make the requisite final review of the National Nutritional Foods Asso-
ciation's objections prior to issuing final FDA regulations.2 The final
regulations, which govern the public sale of dietary supplements, were
preceded by a recital3 that the Commissioner had considered the evi-
dence from public hearings, the hearing examiner's report and all the
later exceptions and written arguments filed against the regulations.
Petitioners argued that the severely limited time available for per-
sonal consideration, even of staff-prepared synopses, 4 suggested that
1. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is directed by statute to con-
sider objections to regulations under the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301 et seq. (1970), before the regulations become final:
[A] ny person who will be adversely affected by such order if placed in effect
may file objections thereto with the Secretary, specifying with particularity the
provisions of the order deemed objectionable, stating the grounds therefor, and
requesting a public hearing upon such objections ....
(3) As soon as practicable after such request for a public hearing, the Secretary,
after due notice, shall hold a public hearing for the purpose of receiving evidence
relevant and material to the issues raised by such objections .... As soon as prac-
ticable after completion of the hearing, the Secretary shall by order act upon
such objections and make such order public.
Id. § 371(e). This Section requires a personal decision by the Secretary. Willapoint
Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1950).
Regulations grant the Commissioner of Food and Drugs authority to perform:
(1) Functions vested in the Secretary under the Federal Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) ....
(i5) Functions vested irl the Secretary regarding the issuance of all regulations
pursuant to authorities cited in paragraphs (1) through (14) of this section.
21 C.F.R. § 2.120(a) (1973). The Commissioner has authorized the Deputy Com-
missioner of Food and Drugs and the Associate Commissioner for Compliance to
perform these functions. 21 C.F.R. §§ 2.120(a), .121 (1973).
3. 38 Fed. Reg. 20712, 20734 (1973).
4. Examination of staff-prepared synopses would provide an adequate basis for
his decision since some division of labor among decisionmaker and subordinates is
regarded as necessary to the performance of an agency's task. See, e.g., Morgan v.
United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481-82 (1936) (Morgan I) (designated official must "hear"
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Commissioner Schmidt in fact had not considered objections to the
regulations and thus had not complied with the authorizing statute in
issuing the challenged regulations. In view of the allegedly "more than
ordinary basis of doubt as to the extent of his personal reading and
consideration," 5 petitioners moved for discovery of the Commission-
er's actual consideration. The motion was denied. Held: Agency head
may not be examined on statutorily required personal consideration of
objections to promulgated regulations despite circumstances raising
doubts concerning the existence of appropriate consideration. Na-
tional Nutritional Foods Association v. Food & Drug Administration,
491 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1974).6
Petitioners in National Nutritional Foods contended that Morgan v.
United States7 (Morgan I) and United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugh-
nessy 8 (Accardi I), cases in which the discovery of an agency head was
permitted, were controlling. In Morgan I, the Supreme Court had
remanded to the district court with instructions to determine whether
in substantial sense, but this requirement does not preclude the use of assistants):
KFC Nat'l Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, 305 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1974)
(staff assistants may prepare recommendations and draft opinions). See generally
2 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.21 (1965).
5. 491 F.2d at 1144 (court's characterization of petitioners' position).
6. In both the court of appeals and the district court, petitioners requested
permission to depose Commissioner Schmidt. The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970), provides for court of appeals review of regu-
lations promulgated under id. § 371(e), the section pertinent here. Id. § 371(f)(1).
Petitioners believed such review would be inadequate because the agency record
would not reflect the adequacy of Schmidt's consideration. The district court dismissed
petitioners' motion for discovery for lack of subject matter jurisdiction believing that
the court of appeals could provide an adequate remedy because its review was not
limited to the agency record. The district court suggested that it agreed with the
agency's contention that the regulations had been properly promulgated. National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Schmidt, 367 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). On appeal
from the district court's dismissal, petitioners renewed their motion to depose Com-
missioner Schmidt. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the motion,
stating: "The facts of this case do not constitute nearly the showing of bad faith
necessary to justify further inquiry [into the adequacy of Commissioner Schmidt's
consideration].- National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1145
(2d Cir. 1974). Wishing to immediately petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, petitioners requested and were granted an order affirming the district court's
opinion. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Schmidt, Civil No. 74-1225 (2d Cir.,
ordered Mar. 26, 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 135 (1974). Petitioners' substantive
objections to the regulations were the subject of another opinion of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Schmidt, 504 F.2d 761 (2d
Cir. 1974).
7. 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
8. 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (5-4 decision). The second Supreme Court decision in
the Accardi matter, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955)
(Accardi 11), is discussed in note 16 infra.
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the Secretary of Agriculture had, in fact, afforded the complainants
the statutorily prescribed hearing.9 Similarly, in Accardi I, the Court
had remanded to the district court for a determination of whether the
Board of Immigation Appeals had, in fact, exercised its own discre-
tion in denying relief to the petitioner. 10
It is generally thought, however, that Morgan v. United States1"
(Morgan IV) reconsidered and reversed Morgan L12 In Morgan IV,
the Court objected to questioning of the administrator13 "at length
regarding the process by which he reached the conclusions of his
9. In Morgan I, the district court originally dismissed the complaint which alleged,
in part, that the Secretary of Agriculture had not met his statutory duty of becoming
acquainted with the evidence prior to fixing maximum commission rates for sales
of livestock at the Kansas City Stock Yards. Morgan v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 766
(W.D. Mo. 1934). The Assistant Secretary had provided the "full hearing" required but
did not make the decision, although entitled to do so as Acting Secretary. The Morgan I
Court reversed, stating that "[t] he defendants should be required to answer these alle-
gations and the question whether plaintiffs had a proper hearing should be determined."
298 U.S. at 482.
10. In Accardi I the Board of Immigration Appeals had ruled that Joseph Accardi
should be deported. The Attorney General had delegated authority in such matters to
the Board. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Attorney
General had compiled a list of "unsavory characters" targeted for deportation and
had circulated this list among Board members. The district court refused to issue the
writ or allow a hearing on the allegations. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1953). The
Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that "the Board's alleged failure to
exercise its own discretion [would be] contrary to existing valid regulations." 347
U.S. at 268 (emphasis in original).
11. 313 U.S. 409 (1941). The Morgan cases are commonly referred to by number
because the Morgan v. United States matter was before the Supreme Court four times:
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (Morgan I); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. I, reh. denied, 304 U.S. 23 (1938) (Morgan II); Morgan v. United States,
307 U.S. 183 (1939) (Morgan I1); and Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409
(1941) (Morgan IV).
The district court proceeding directly following Morgan I established that plaintiffs
had received a full and fair hearing and that the contested rate order was therefore
valid. Morgan v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 380 (W.D. Mo. 1937). The appeal from
that judgment resulted in reversal by the Supreme Court in Morgan IL The opinion
suggests at least two grounds for that reversal: (1) the absence of an intermediate
decisional report providing the plaintiffs some idea of the issues presented to the
ultimate decisionmaker, see W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES
AND COMMENTS 916 (5th ed. 1970), or (2) the Secretary's ex parte consultation with
staff members charged with the prosecution of the matter. See Schwartz, Institutional
Administrative Decisions and the Morgan Cases: A Re-Examination, 4 J. PuB. L. 49,
79-80 (1955).
Morgan III considered the disposition of funds impounded pending the outcome
of the rate controversy. The Secretary of Agriculture decided to promulgate an all-
new rate order. The district court's examination of the Secretary on his consideration
of this new order was at issue in Morgan IV.
12. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.05 (1965).
13. The terms "administrator" and "agency head" are used interchangeably in this
Note.
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order, including the manner and extent of his study of the record
and his consultation with subordinates."14 The Morgan IV Court
was blunt: "The short of the business is that the Secretary should
never have been subjected to this examination."' 15 The Accardi I deci-
sion did not mention Morgan IV and their relationship is unclear. 16
In reviewing these decisions, the National Nutritional Foods court
noted that Morgan IV has been qualified in that discovery of an ad-
ministrator's mental process is permitted upon a strong showing of
bad faith or improper behavior on the part of the decisionmaker. 17
Since the only suggestion of irregularity in National Nutritional Foods
was the short time between Schmidt's installation as Commissioner and
his issuance of the regulations, the court believed that Morgan IV
14. 313 U.S. at 422.
15. Id.
16. In the district court proceeding following Accardi I, testimony was taken
from members of the Board of Immigration Appeals indicating the existence of a
Justice Department list of undesirables targeted for deportation, with which the
Board members were acquainted. The Board members further testified that their deci-
sions were unaffected by these actions of their superior. The district court accepted
this testimony as settling the issue and did not grant a new hearing for Mr. Accardi.
The court of appeals disagreed with the lower court, however, and reversed and
remanded. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1955).
Judge Frank, writing for the court, regarded the testimony as sincere but highly im-
probable. He believed that in such circumstances the Board members must have been
"unconsciously influenced" by the Attorney General's list. 219 F.2d at 81. Chief
Judge Clark, concurring, believed evidence of a publicized list was sufficient to create
a "presumption of bias" and that the Board's further testimony should be ignored.
Circuit Judge Harlan, in dissent, would have accepted the Board's testimony and the
trial court's appraisal of it, and dismissed the writ.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the
district court decision. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280
(1955) (Accardi 11). The majority agreed with Circuit Judge Harlan and gave weight
to the Board's testimony. Justice Black, joined by Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, took
Chief Judge Clark's position, arguing that Morgan IV prohibits consideration of
testimony on the Board member's decisional process. This position is apparently based
on the impossibility of reconstructing a decision: " [T] his practice is no more desirable
than that of probing the minds of judges to try to fathom the reasons which prompt
their decisions." Id. at 290. The dissent's argument may have been suggested by
Morgan IV, but was not developed by the Morgan IV Court. A better presentation of
the argument may be found in NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219 (1947).
See text accompanying note 40 infra.
Professor Davis suggests that the Accardi II dissenters impair the strength of
Accardi I since they were two of the five justices in the Accardi I majority. K. DAvis.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.05 n. 10 (1965). Yet the dissenters' objection
was only to a "probe of mental processes"; they found that the primary probe of
surrounding circumstances was valid, and, in fact, sufficient in itself to require a new
trial for Accardi.
17. 491 F.2d at 1145. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (dictum); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d
200 (4th Cir. 1964); Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
affd, 377 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1967).
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foreclosed any inquiry into the mental processes of an administrator.
Petitioners had failed to make the required strong showing of bad
faith.
Petitioners had sought to distinguish Morgan IV as protecting only
the administrator's mental processes in making a decision, not prohib-
iting inquiry into whether an administrator followed statutorily-re-
quired procedures making a decision. It is submitted that the Second
Circuit court erred in rejecting this distinction. Adherence to procedural
steps in the decisional process should properly be considered sepa-
rately from the actual exercise of judgment pursuant to those steps.
The Second Circuit court in National Nutritional Foods read Morgan
IV as preventing discovery of procedural steps specifically incorporated
in the statute to ensure the proper exercise of the administrator's judg-
ment.
The Second Circuit court's misunderstanding of the word "process"
apparently led to this erroneous reading of Morgan IV. "Process" may
be used, in this context, in one of two ways. First, the term may be
applied to the reasoning act involved in making a decision. It is in this
sense that Morgan IV prohibits discovery of an agency head's "mental
process." For the sake of clarity, this sense of the term will be referred
to as the "judgmental process." In contrast, petitioner's request in-
volved the second meaning of "process," i.e., the procedural steps that
may be required by law in making a decision.
Of course, both processes are involved in an agency decision. This
note will examine the reasons supporting protection of the adminis-
trator from judicial inquiry in light of cases suggesting a
judgmental/nonjudgmental distinction. It will outline a form of limited
discovery designed to examine only the procedural aspects of the ad-
ministrator's "mental process" and determine what reasons remain to
deny or restrict the use of such limited inquiry.
I. THE DECISIONAL PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW
The National Nutritional Foods court dealt with a major character-
istic of administrative agencies-the "institutional decision"; i.e., a
decision by the agency as an entity rather than primarily by an identi-
fiable, personally responsible decisionmaker. Such institutional deci-
sions are a necessary evil since an agency can scarcely afford to
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permit a highly placed decisionmaker to devote the time necessary to
personally shepherd a problem from start to finish.
Generally, agencies divide the decisionmaking process into a series
of tasks. 18 Subordinates may make extensive findings of fact, analyze
situations and provide recommendations to a superior. Often statutes
go further and designate specific officials as decisionmakers.1 9 When
such a designated decisionmaker does not personally make a required
decision, the statutory scheme is thwarted and the quality (and va-
lidity) of the decision is suspect.20 Judicial review of this personal de-
18. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.10 (1965).
19. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(b) (1970) (Secretary of Agriculture designated under
Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970)); 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)
(3) (1970) (Secretary of HEW designated under Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970)); 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) (NLRB designated under
National Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970)). Such
designation creates personal responsibility and accountability which tend to improve
the decisions' qualiiy. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 45 (1941). Presumably, an
individual is appointed to serve as an agency head, in part at least, for his or her
decisionmaking abilities. Agency organization also favors designation of the chief
agency official as decisionmaker: he or she generally has expert staff advice and is
less restricted by precedent than subordinates.
Procedural rules serve to guide the agency decisionmaking process and thus seek
to eliminate erroneous decisions which may be completely protected from judicial
interference by virtue of their inclusion within the agency's latitude in decisionmaking,
e.g., not arbitrary and capricious. Rules structuring the decisionmaking process may
appear worthless in a particular case but are enforced nevertheless. See Weekes v.
O'Connell, 304 N.Y. 259, 107 N.E.2d 290 (1952). Stating, "findings being subject only
to limited judicial review, administrative agencies should ever be mindful of the heavy
responsibility thereby imposed," the New York court struck down a State Liquor
Authority liquor license revocation done in violation of Authority rules. 107 N.E.2d
at 293. See also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260. 268 (1954)
(Accardi I) (petitioner entitled to new hearing on showing that the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals failed to exercise its own discretion, even where the same adverse
decision may result); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1969)
(criminal tax fraud conviction based on statements obtained by Internal Revenue
Service agents contrary to Service rules reversed and remanded for new determinations
regardless of whether compliance with the procedures would produce a different
result).
20. The real decisionmaker may be an eminently qualified subordinate, but then
again may not be. One cannot be certain. Professor Schwartz uses the Morgan cases
as an example:
The order was signed by the Secretary of Agriculture, but we know from the
Morgan cases that the decision was his only in a formal sense. It is impossible to
say who made the actual decision-what official in the Department really directed
his mind to the evidence and arguments and drew therefrom the final conclusions
adopted by the Secretary. The examiner probably discussed the case with his
superior, and the latter discussed it with a bigger flea, and so ad infinitum. Ulti-
mately, the order got the seal of the Secretary.
Schwartz, Institutional Administrative Decisions and the Morgan Cases: A Re-Exam-
ination, 4 J. PuB. L. 49, 56 (1955).
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cision requirement is complicated by the protection provided by
Morgan IV to administrators' "mental processes."
Although the Morgan IV Court's apparently absolute prohibition
against inquiry into an administrator's judgmental processes has been
qualified by the lower courts, any inquiry must be supported by a sub-
stantial showing of misconduct. In Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
NLRB,2 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, under
Morgan IV, a reasonable showing of administrative misconduct enti-
tles the aggrieved party to further investigation of an agency decision.
Similarly, a federal district court, in Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon,22
found that circumstances surrounding a decision of a federal agency
created a "prima facie" case of "sham or subterfuge" of a state statute
and, therefore, held inapplicable the Morgan IV "mental process"
privilege. The Supreme Court recognized and apparentfy endorsed
this qualification of Morgan IV, in dictum, in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.23
Judicial review of an administrator's decision is also complicated by
the privilege granted in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United
States24 to the agency's "internal reasoning process," i.e., the exchange
within the agency of documents containing frank communications be-
tween decisionmaker and staff. This reasoning process has been recog-
21. 329 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1964), noted in 78 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1965).
22. 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965), affd sub nom. Bank of Dearborn v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 377 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1967).
23. 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). Overton Park involved review of the Secretary of
Transportation's authorization of an interstate highway through a public park. The
Court noted that before an inquiry into an administrator's mental process (as used in
the judgmental sense) when contemporaneous formal findings exist, there must be "a
strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior ..... Id. In Overton Park there were
no such formal findings and the Court hinted that inquiry into mental processes might be
proper without this showing. But the Court suggested that the Secretary of Transpor-
tation could, even subsequent to the Court's decision, prepare formal findings which
might prove sufficient to sustain his decision.
Also pertinent in this context is KFC Nat'l Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497
F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974). There, certification of a union as the representative of
employees was delegated by the National Labor Relations Board to Regional Directors,
subject to review by the Board on specified grounds. The grant of such review was to
be formally decided by a three-member panel of the Board. Two of the three Board
panel members gave their staff assistants general proxies for the purpose of serving
in their place on this review granting panel. The court noted the general rule that once
there is a "prima facie demonstration of impropriety," inquiry into the decisionmaking
process is allowed. But the court found the showing and inquiry unnecessary because
there was no claim that the Board members who gave the proxies ever considered the
case. The court required Board consideration of petitioner's request for review.
24. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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nized as "inextricably intertwined" 25 with the administrator's mental
process and, thus, the same qualifications applied to the Morgan IV
privilege have been applied to the Kaiser privilege26 for intra-agency
communications. 27
II. RECOGNITION OF A PROCEDURAL/JUDGMENTAL
DISTINCTION IN AN ADMINISTRATOR'S "MENTAL
PROCESS"
Morgan IV and Kaiser protect the judgmental processes of both
administrator and staff. Each case's rule complements the other and
"in combination they operate to preserve the integrity of the delibera-
25. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. 318, 326 (D.D.C. 1966),
affd per curia, sub norn. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967). The District Court for the District of Columbia
outlined the interrelationship between the "administrator's mental process privilege"
and the "internal agency reasoning process privilege":
Inextricably intertwined, both in purpose and objective, are these two principles.
The rule immunizing intra-governmental advice safeguards free expression by
eliminating the possibility of outside examination as an inhibiting factor, but
expressions assisting the reaching of a decision are part of the decisionmaking
process. Similarly, the so-called "mental process rule" impresses the stamp of
secrecy more directly upon the decision than upon the advice, but it extends to all
phases of the decisionmaking process, of which the advice is a part. Each rule com-
plements the other, and in combination they operate to preserve the integrity of
the deliberative process itself.
40 F.R.D. at 326 (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, courts have recognized that the administrator's judgmental processes
might be compromised through interrogation of staff members, see Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1964), or disclosure of internal
memoranda. See Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, 363 F.2d 600. 603 (5th
Cir. 1966).
26. See Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1965). in which
the plaintiff established a "reasonable basis" for requested discovery of intra-agency
communications related to an alleged conspiracy against plaintiff by certain agency
personnel.
Rosee is apparently the only case in which the agency's intra-agency communications
privilege was overcome when the government was not a party to the litigation. See, e.g.,
Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961) (special master allowed to
privately examine NLRB files on request of employer accused of unfair labor practices
by Board). In ruling on the opponent's motion for discovery, it is also significant
whether the government is plaintiff or defendant. United States v. San Antonio
Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513, 515 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
27. An "intra-agency communications privilege" is most commonly invoked as an
exception to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq. (1970). The
FOIA requires disclosure of any agency information not exempted under the Act
upon request by any member of the public. Section 552(b)(5) of the Act exempts
from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."
An overview of the statute is contained in K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
3A.28 (Supp. 1970).
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tive process itself."'28 Before permitting inquiry into such matters, pre-
dictably the courts require a strong showing of bad faith. 29 Imposi-
tion, however, of the same strict standard to discovery of procedural
irregularities is inappropriate. Courts applying the Kaiser rule have
properly avoided application of the strict standard to nonjudgmental
issues when considering discovery of intra-agency communication,
and distinguish discovery of factual information from discovery ofjudg-
mental information. 30 Factual information is generally discover-
able; judgmental information privileged. The administrator's deci-
sional process requires application of a similar distinction.
A. Judicial Support for a Procedural/Judgmental Distinction
The Supreme Court has treated an inquiry into procedural regu-
larity differently than an inquiry into judgmental processes. In De-
Cambra v. Rogers,31 Morgan v. United States32 (Morgan II), and
Morgan IV, the Court clearly prohibited examination and dissection
of an administrator's judgment. But a close reading of both Morgan I
and Accardi I reveals the petitioners were entitled to examine if-
28. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. 318, 326 (D.D.C. 1966),
affd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
29. See note 17 supra. Although no court has compared the showing required
prior to discovery of communications of the agency staff's opinions with the "strong
showing of bad faith" required prior to discovery of an administrator's "mental
process," the fact that strong policies support the privilege from discovery in both
instances, suggests the standard in both situations is equally strict. Carl Zeiss Stiftung
v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966), affd per curiam sub nom.,
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
30. See, e.g., Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The
distinction is noted in 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.61(7), at 26-331 (2d ed.
1970), and Consumers Union of United States v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 805 n.41
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). The factlopinion distinction also appears in the FOIA's exemption
from public disclosure for intra-agency communications. See note 27 supra. The
Supreme Court has used case law in this area of discovery, developed prior to enact-
ment of the FOIA, as a basis for applying the exemption. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 88-89 (1973), citing Machin, supra, Boeing Airplane Co., supra, and similar
cases. Organization of factual data by agency staff may create materials which,
although not explicitly "deliberative," are still part of the agency deliberative process
and thus lrivileged. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (FOIA case).
31. 189 U.S. 119, 122 (1903) (Secretary of Interior decided land claim adversely
to DeCambra; decision appeared regular in all respects and the Court refused to
inquire further).
32. 304U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
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not how-the decisionmakers had exercised their statutory authority,
and thus indicates the Court's willingness to allow inquiry into allega-
tions of procedural irregularity.
Obviously, the best assurance of the proper personal consideration
is a complete examination of the agency head's mental process in
reaching a decision; however, recognition and use of less intrusive
means of discovery could provide a basic check on the agency and
reconcile the superficially contradictory Supreme Court holdings. Such
a limited-in-scope inquiry could guarantee personal consideration by
the agency head, yet avoid inquiry into the area privileged under
Morgan IV.
Limited discovery has been approved by two lower courts. In D.C.
Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 33 a district court allowed
counsel to interrogate the Secretary of Transportation to determine
whether the Secretary had made necessary decisions prior to siting a
highway inside a park.3 4 In allowing this examination, the court dis-
tinguished between investigation of the existence of steps followed or
materials utilized in reaching a decision and investigation of the judg-
mental process:35
[I]t was only by allowing the questioning of the Secretary himself
that the Court could ascertain whether the decisions were in fact made
and what constituted the basis of the decisions.
The Court is aware that the Supreme Court in United States v.
Morgan . . . prohibited the probing of the mental process of a deci-
sionmaker to determine his reasoning in making a decision. The inter-
33. 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
34. Id. at 769 & n.30, 771-72 & n.32.
35. Id. at 760-61 n.12; cf. United States v. Smith, 22 F.R.D. 482 (N.D. I11. 1958).
In Smith, defendants in a criminal prosecution, having received a grand jury subpoena
of certain records, submitted the records but were not called before the grand jury.
Charges were filed against the defendants solely on the basis of the records. Suspecting
government subterfuge, defendants sought to inquire into the procedural regularity of
the issuance of the subpoena. The government objected that the solicited responses
would violate the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings. The court concluded,
however, that the protected area, the deliberations of the grand jury, would not be
violated by granting the request. Cases which allowed the discovery of grand jury
transcripts only after a showing of misuse of grand jury process were distinguished:
In . . . many similar cases, the transcript of the actual testimony before the grand
jury was requested. Here, what is being sought is peripheral facts about the
grand jury, not what occurred before it.
22 F.R.D. at 484. The court applied a less stringent standard to discovery of non-
protected "peripheral facts" than to discovery of "actual testimony." Thus, a showing
of misuse was held unnecessary.
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rogation of Secretary Volpe here was limited to the actions which he
took, and the materials which he considered as a basis for his determi-
nation, rather than his mental process in considering these materials.
The D.C. Federation court thus equated the "reasoning in making a
decision" with the protected "mental process" of the administrator.
The actual components of a determination, such as facts and required
findings, were regarded as discoverable, almost as a matter of course.
Similarly, a district court in Union Savings Bank v. Saxon36
granted plaintiffs permission to orally depose an agency head in cir-
cumstances much like those in National Nutritional Foods. The plain-
tiffs in Union Savings Bank alleged on "information and belief' that
defendant Saxon made a decision on the basis of ex parte representa-
tions and a personal relationship with an interested party. The court
recognized problems involved with indiscriminate discovery of an
agency head following any agency action, but reasoned that the "pe-
culiar circumstances" justified a limited discovery. The oral deposition
was "limited to the procedural action taken by the Defendant as to the
subject matter of this case, and not the workings of his (Saxon's)
mind."37
Neither the D.C. Federation nor the Union Savings Bank court
applied the "strong showing of bad faith" standard necessary for in-
quiry into judgmental areas protected by Morgan IV. Both courts uti-
lized a procedural/judgmental distinction in deciding the propriety
and form of discovery. Since neither court set forth a new standard,
yet permitted limited discovery, one might conclude that one need
only show that information sought in a procedural inquiry is needed
and relevant-the same standard which ordinarily must be met to jus-
tify discovery of facts in an agency's possession.38
36. 209 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1962).
37. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
899 (1963) (factual findings in Air Force investigative report, prepared immediately
after accident, held discoverable by aircrew member in action against manufacturer
of aircraft assembly); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (industry profit data, collected by United States Renegotiation Board, held
discoverable for defense against an Internal Revenue Service action to tax alleged
excess profits).
This standard may not, however, be applicable to nonenvironmental cases, since
courts have permitted unusually searching inquiries in environmental actions. See
Federal Administrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, 323 n.35
(1972); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 322 (1971). A stricter
standard is suggested in Part II-C infra.
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B. The Mental Process Rule of Morgan IV and Limited Discovery
An examination of the reasons supporting protection of an agency
head's mental processes from discovery bolsters the conclusion, sug-
gested by the preceding cases, that application of the strict "strong
showing of bad faith" standard is inappropriate for discovery of pro-
cedural irregularities. Four basic reasons support the Morgan IV
privilege against discovery of an administrator's mental processes:
(1) such an examination would consume a valuable administra-
tive resource-the chief administrator's time; 39
(2) the examination of the factors that entered into the adminis-
trator's ultimate decision would be extremely difficult, perhaps
impossible, since the exercise of judgment is a weighing process
not susceptible to cross-examination; 40
(3) such examination would lead to judicial usurpation of the
administrator's role as decisionmaker; 41 and
(4) the examination would offend the administrator and tend to
undermine his or her sense of responsibility. 42
These reasons against discovery of an agency head are substantially
obviated by a restricted form of discovery-an inquiry limited to
whether the administrator substantively considered objections to pro-
posed regulations. Such an inquiry could consist of simple interrogato-
ries or, alternatively, an affidavit by the agency head indicating
whether, realistically speaking, the administrator rendered a personal
judgment on the matter. 43
39. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47
YALE L.J. 647, 662 (1938). See Virgo Corp. v. Paiewonsky, 39 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D.V.I.
1966). Harassment of the decisionmaker by disappointed parties is possible and must
be guarded against. See NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F.2d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 1939).
40. NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 229 (1947).
41. The use of increasingly scarce judicial resources in the re-evaluation of an
administrator's judgment must also be considered. Like appellate review of trial
courts, judicial review of agency action must be selective to enable the administrative
and judicial systems to function effectively.
42. See Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Morgan IV).
43. The administrator's failure to submit to this inquiry should render the agency
order unenforceable until such time as the administrator is willing to attest to its
propriety. Of course, the veracity of a reply would be ascertainable only after a pre-
liminary strong showing of impropriety since this probe involves a detailed inquiry
into mental processes contrary to Morgan IV and three of the four reasons supporting
that privilege. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra. A false answer to an affidavit
should dictate a penalty commensurate with abuse of a solemn proceeding. Cf. 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) ("Whoever ... knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . a material
fact ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
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This limitation would wholly eliminate two of the four objections
noted. Such limited discovery would not require the detailed examina-
tion of the multitude of factors that enter into a decision,44 con-
demned by the Morgan IV Court, nor could it lead to usurpation by
the courts of the administrator's duties. 45 The limited scope of the
procedure would substantially eliminate aspersions on the administra-
tor's veracity and the objectionable use of the administrator's time. An
infrequent affidavit affirming that proper procedures had been ob-
served would not unduly burden the administrator. 46 Thus, the objec-
tions generally raised against examination of agency decisionmakers
lose much of their persuasiveness when set against limited-in-scope
discovery restricted to situations where there is unusual doubt about
the regularity of agency action.
Similarly, this form of discovery, consistent with the policy ex-
pressed in Kaiser, would not permit public examination of intra-
agency communications furnished the agency head.47 Where staff
memoranda and information are relied on, the administrator could af-
firm that not only did he or she make a personal judgment on the mat-
ter, but also that these materials embodied alternative solutions or
conclusions, rather than merely the final one.
The court or the opposing parties would not be permitted to ex-
or both."). The efficacy of this inquiry does not depend primarily on penalties for
false statements or the invalidation of improperly considered decisions. The adminis-
trator generally has no interest in the concealment of present agency procedures that
would outweigh concern for personal integrity. The inquiry would act to remedy
errors in a particular case by prompting administrative reconsideration, or in general
by prompting changes in governing statutes and regulations. See notes 54-55 and
accompanying text infra.
44. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 39 & 42 supra. Naturally, the effect will depend
on the availability of such review. See discussion in Part I1-C infra. Limitations on
the scope of discovery should prevent a disappointed party from improperly using
discovery procedures to harass the administrator and disrupt agency operations.
47. The "agency reasoning process" privilege was set forth in Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 945-46 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Retired
Justice Reed, sitting on the Court of Claims, reasoned that disclosure of subordinates'
recommendations might inhibit frank intra-agency discussion and result in ill-consid-
ered agency decisions. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq. (1970), embodies an
additional policy consideration-that premature disclosure of agency records might
imperil the proper functioning of the administrative process. Note, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1047, 1049 & n.l1 (1973). This consideration is applicable to discovery generally,
see United States v. Pennsalt Chems. Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1966),
but is not present in the National Nutritional Foods factual situation.
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amine particular materials furnished the agency head. Public or pri-
vate examination of the materials and evaluation of their validity as
decisional foundations unavoidably involves consideration of the ad-
ministrator's personal knowledge of the areas affected by his or her
decision and the facts of the particular case. This examination should
be measured against Morgan IV-type standards, for it goes beyond a
basic check on the regularity of agency action to an evaluation of the
administrator's judgmental process.
Moreover, the courts should respect the administrator's judgment
concerning the degree of study of intra-agency materials necessary for
a proper evaluation of the issues confronted. Nonetheless, statutes
generally insist upon, and the courts can and should confirm, the fact
of some examination. The statute48 involved in National Nutritional
Foods does not specify any particular amount of involvement by the
administrator in any particular problem. An administrator can and
will use staff to frame issues for decision, to analyze factual matters
and to make recommendations based on agency experience and on the
publicized decisional philosophy of the administrator. 49 For example,
if "findings of fact" will constitute the "judgmental" part of a decision,
the administrator must make such findings. 50 If, however, the crucial
issues remain once findings of fact are made, the decisionmaker may
properly leave such findings to subordinates. But the agency head
should be trusted to sense and state whether he or she encountered
the crucial issues, however denominated, of the decision.
C. Presumption of Regularity
The proposed limited form of inquiry fully rebuts only two objec-
tions to discovery of an agency head; two objections remain.51 Abuse
of the affidavit procedure to discover facts concerning the regularity
48. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970); see note 2 supra.
49. See note 4 supra.
50. The Department of Transportation's internal procedures, which were reviewed
in D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), illus-
trates how a finding of fact may be sufficiently determinative of the final decision
so as to be reserved to the agency head. The statute at issue there, 23 U.S.C. § 138
(1970), provides that a highway project through certain publicly owned lands shall
not be approved unless the Secretary of Transportation has determined that (1) there
is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land and (2) such program
includes all possible planning to minimize harm from such use. These determinations,
although not "final" in the sense of the last decision, were crucial to the final outcome.
51. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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of agency action would add to the demands on the decisionmaker's
time and may also detract from the solemnity and integrity of the
administrative process. Affidavits could easily become as untrust-
worthy and as "boilerplate" as were the recitals preceding the regula-
tions in National Nutritional Foods.
Commonly, agency actions are accorded a presumption of regu-
larity.52 Application of this presumption would eliminate misuse of the
limited discovery procedure by requiring a showing of unusual cir-
cumstances that suggest procedural irregularity before discovery would
be permitted. The Second Circuit court should have measured the
short period of "consideration" in National Nutritional Foods against
this presumption. The facts of the case suggest the presumption would
have been overcome had the court applied it.5 3 The facts did not,
however, satisfy the court's test of a "strong showing of bad faith or
impropriety"--appropriate only when considering discovery of the
judgmental process protected by Morgan IV.
I. CONCLUSION
Under Morgan IV and Kaiser, the courts have properly provided
governmental agencies with protection from unwarranted probing of
the judgmental processes involved in decisionmaking. This protection,
52. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1911);
Oestereich v. Selective Service Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1968); United
States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing,
174 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1950).
53. The fact that Commissioner Schmidt had only 13 days in which to consider
numerous and lengthy objections to the proposed regulations strongly suggests irregu-
larity in the agency process. The court's opinion clearly implies that a mere pre-
sumption would have been overcome: "It is plain enough that if this motion had
come before us in the period between the first Morgan case ... and the fourth and
the last appearance of the Morgan case.., we would have been obliged to grant it."
491 F.2d at 1144. Development of the presumption of regularity apparently reflects
a concern about erosion of agency responsibility, which possibility is present in
dis covery of any agency personnel. The fact that discovery involves the agency head
may strengthen the presumption slightly because it also reflects a general concern
for the chief official's limited time. See, e.g., Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study
of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 647, 662 (1938). However, the amount
of time an administrator spends verifying and attesting to proper procedures does not
appear sufficient to warrant significant change in the presumption. Other circumstances,
not present in National Nutritional Foods, might render a presumption of regularity
effectively irrebuttable. Emergency mobilization by Selective Service boards, for
example, requires swift administrative action and would likely preclude objections to
procedural defects. National Nutritional Foods, however, presents no such justifica-
tion; 11 years had elapsed between the first FDA consideration of regulations and
adoption of final regulations. See 38 Fed. Reg. 20711 (1973). Similarly, a lack of
feasible alternatives to the present decisionmaking scheme, e.g., a single authorized
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however, should not abrogate a statutory requirement that a desig-
nated official personally consider and decide an issue. Compliance
with this essentially procedural statutory requirement can be verified
without encountering the problems inherent in a complete review of
an administrator's reasoning process. The administrator should be
required to confirm, either by affidavit or limited deposition, that all
statutory procedures have been observed. This requirement would in
turn be limited to instances, such as presented in National Nutritional
Foods, where circumstances preclude a "presumption of regularity."
The proposed form of discovery, limited as it may be, would serve
to measure administrative realities against statutory requirements. The
possibility that an affidavit may be demanded from the decision's sig-
natory will encourage proper consideration by that individual. If this
consideration is too burdensome for nominal decisionmakers, an
agency may utilize other authorized officials to make and sign deci-
sions,54 modify applicable regulations, or seek congressional action to
authorize more decisionmakers or transfer decisionmaking func-
tions.55 Thus, even limited and infrequent affidavits or depositions may
produce far-reaching and beneficial changes in the structure of the
decisional process. Robert O' Callahan
decisionmaker, would tend to strengthen the presumption. The FDA, however, had
two other officials fully qualified to perform the task Commissioner Schmidt nomimally
assumed. See note 2 supra. See also notes 54-55 and accompanying text infra.
54. The FDA could have chosen this alternative in National Nutritional Foods.
See note 2 supra.
55. The experience of the NLRB is illustrative. Prior to 1959, the Board's
caseload reduced its ability to perform effectively. Congress noted the problem
and amended § 143(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141 et seq. (1970), to authorize delegation of employee representation decisions
to the Board's Regional Directors, subject to Board review if the appeal falls within
specified categories. See KFC Nat'l Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298,
302 (2d Cir. 1974); Hearings on S. 505, S. 748, S. 76, S. 1002, S. 1137 and S. 1311
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 649 (1959); Hearings on H.R. 3540, H.R. 3302, H.R. 4473, and
H.R. 4474 before a Joint Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959). An alternative solution would permit the
hearing examiner to personally render a decision subject to appellate-type review by
top agency officials. This procedure creates personal responsibility for the decision,
provides a known decisionmaker to which the parties can argue, and allows the decision-
maker with proper organization to effectively utilize much of the agency expertise.
Both solutions are recommended by the Administrative Conference, a Federal agency
formed to improve the administrative process. 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 122-24 (1970). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970), does not go so far; it essentially allows the agency to
disregard the hearing examiner's decision. Id. § 557; see Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (Taft-Hartley Act, under which the NLRB was operating,
construed in a similar manner to the APA).
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